Submission on the Draft Expectations for Data Centres and AI Infrastructure Developers: Tasmania

To: Building Tasmania, Tasmanian Government
Date: 11 October 2026
Submitted by: [redacted]
Subject: A statutory, public-interest framework—not an invitation to expand industrial-scale AI data centres

Request for confidentiality – withholding of personal information

I request that my name, contact details and any other information that could identify me be kept confidential and not published or disclosed in any publicly available version of this submission, consultation report or related material. I consent to the substantive contents of my submission being published anonymously. I ask that my personal information be used only for the administration of this consultation and that, to the extent permitted by law, it not be disclosed to third parties.

Executive summary

I oppose the establishment of a large-scale AI data centre industry in Tasmania. The scale of the electricity and water demand, the infrastructure that would be built to service it, and the political and commercial influence of major technology corporations present unacceptable risks to Tasmanians unless the State fundamentally changes its approach.

I do not support the construction of additional wind farms, transmission corridors or other environmentally damaging energy infrastructure to accommodate data centres. The fact that electricity is described as "renewable" does not remove the harm associated with its generation and transmission. Those impacts often fall upon rural communities, agricultural land and natural environments far from the data centre itself.

At most, I could support consideration of a tightly limited industry using genuinely surplus electricity from *existing* generation—for example, electricity released by the closure or contraction of a major industrial user—provided that an independent assessment establishes that this energy is not needed by households, essential services, existing industry or other higher-value uses; that water and environmental impacts are acceptable; and that the development requires no damaging new generation or transmission infrastructure. The existence of surplus electricity must not, by itself, create an entitlement to consume it.

The Government's *Draft Expectations for Data Centres and AI Infrastructure Developers* starts from the premise that attracting data centres is desirable and mainly asks how their development can be facilitated. The prior question has not been answered: **would Tasmania, its people and its environment be better off with an industrial-scale data centre industry at all?** That question requires an independent, whole-of-state assessment of net public benefit, competing uses of scarce resources and cumulative impacts.

Most fundamentally, the draft states that it is **non-statutory** and does not create new regulatory obligations (p. 3). A policy whose central safeguards rely on expectations, encouragement and assurances is not an adequate response to projects capable of consuming hundreds of megawatts around the clock. Even provisions expressed in the draft as "must" or "required" do not, by appearing in a non-statutory statement, become independently enforceable legal obligations.

I therefore ask the Government to:

1. **Suspend approval of new or expanded large-scale data centres** pending an independent statewide assessment and establishment of suitable statutory controls, while respecting existing legal processes and rights.
2. **Remove the policy requirement for data centres to support new wind and solar projects** and reject the proposition that expanding generation and transmission to serve them is necessarily in Tasmania's interests.
3. Establish legislated eligibility limits, including a cap on the total data centre load that Tasmania will permit and an independently verified existing-surplus-electricity test.
4. Introduce **mandatory, enforceable** standards for electricity demand, grid stability, water consumption, air emissions, noise, safety, community participation, financial assurance, transparency and ownership.

5. Require assessment of each project's full build-out and of cumulative on-site and off-site impacts, including supporting generation, firming, storage, transmission, roads, water systems and telecommunications infrastructure.
6. Prevent costs and commercial risks being shifted to households, taxpayers or publicly owned businesses, particularly Hydro Tasmania, TasNetworks, Aurora Energy and TasWater.
7. Protect democratic decision-making from corporate political influence, with stronger restrictions on political donations and gifts, comprehensive disclosure of lobbying and government dealings, and enforceable conflict-of-interest safeguards.
8. Establish an independent regulator with adequate powers to inspect, enforce conditions, impose significant penalties, order operational reductions or cessation, and seek suspension or cancellation of permissions for serious or repeated breaches.

These are not suggested voluntary undertakings. They must be established in legislation, regulations, enforceable licence and approval conditions, and—where relevant—the national electricity regulatory framework.

1. The basic policy question and scope of the Expectations

The Government should not decide that Tasmania will become a major destination for AI factories and then seek only to mitigate the consequences. It should first commission an independent comparison of proposed data centres with alternative uses of energy, water, land and public infrastructure. That assessment should examine permanent jobs, Tasmanian value added, tax receipts, opportunity costs, grid and water security, regional impacts, environmental harm, public financial exposure, and risks under adverse economic scenarios.

Claims about jobs and investment must distinguish construction activity from permanent employment. A large announced investment is not, by itself, proof of enduring public benefit. Projects should be assessed by the measurable benefits retained in Tasmania relative to the scarce resources consumed and risks imposed.

The *Draft Expectations for Data Centres and AI Infrastructure Developers* excludes small-scale edge and on-site enterprise facilities (p. 3). Whatever thresholds are adopted for a new framework, proponents must not be allowed to avoid comprehensive assessment by dividing a single project into stages, separate sites or related corporate entities. Thresholds should address both the individual facility and the aggregate demand and impacts of connected proposals.

Requested change: Replace the draft's presumption in favour of attracting large-scale developments with an explicit public-interest threshold, a moratorium pending independent review, enforceable scale limits, and a requirement that proposed developments demonstrate a net benefit over alternative uses of Tasmania's resources.

2. Expectation 1 — Maximising benefits to Tasmania

The proposal that developers provide jobs, training and local procurement does not adequately answer who pays, who benefits and where the profits go. The Government should require independently verified estimates of permanent employment after construction, locally retained economic value, public costs, energy and water intensity per permanent job, and the opportunity cost of displacing other Tasmanian industries.

A major concern is the possibility of profits being transferred offshore through related-party payments, financing arrangements and transfer pricing. Corporate income taxation is predominantly a Commonwealth responsibility, but Tasmania can require lawful disclosure of ultimate beneficial ownership, group structure, related-party arrangements, Australian taxation compliance and the public value of State concessions. It should cooperate with Commonwealth tax authorities, rather than accepting unsupported promises that a large investment will necessarily produce a commensurate public return.

Foreign ownership and control raise additional questions about who ultimately directs operations, where information and profits flow, and how critical infrastructure could be affected by decisions made outside Tasmania. Changes in beneficial ownership or effective control should be reportable and subject to any applicable Commonwealth foreign-investment and critical-infrastructure requirements.

Developers should provide adequate bonds, parent-company guarantees, security or other independently assessed assurances covering remediation, decommissioning, infrastructure liabilities and failure to fulfil long-term commitments.

Recent events underscore the need for prudence. On 9 October 2026, Firmus withdrew its proposed Australian sharemarket listing and announced that it would seek alternative funding. That event does not demonstrate insolvency, but it does show that developers' financing plans can change rapidly. Public infrastructure and long-term commercial arrangements must not depend on optimistic projections without robust protection against failure. [10]

Requested change: Replace general expressions of economic benefit with mandatory, independently audited public-benefit and financial-capacity tests, beneficial-ownership disclosure, full cost recovery and enforceable financial assurances.

3. Expectation 2 — Early engagement with community and stakeholders

Early engagement is necessary, but it is not the same as community consent or accountability. Residents must have the information and time needed to understand a proposal before key commercial and site-selection decisions become effectively irreversible.

Proponents should be required to publish, before any development application, the total proposed electricity demand at full build-out, predicted and maximum water use, sources and legal availability of water, noise modelling (including low-frequency, tonal and cumulative effects), all planned diesel and other backup generation, air emissions, hazardous substances, traffic and clearing, associated infrastructure, alternative sites, financial and ownership arrangements, and any known risks to nearby residents.

Information should be made available in accessible forms, including non-technical summaries and underlying technical reports. Meaningful engagement must include adjoining landowners, residents in affected noise and airsheds, farmers and other water users, local councils, Tasmanian Aboriginal communities, environmental organisations, and communities affected by associated generation and transmission—not only neighbours of the data centre building.

I am also concerned about companies seeking what is sometimes called "social licence" through sponsorships and donations. Firmus's sponsorship of the Tasmania Devils has been publicly reported. A sponsorship is not evidence of wrongdoing, but nor is it evidence of community consent or compliance. [11] Major sponsorships, community payments and benefits connected with a proponent seeking approval should be disclosed so that decision-makers and the public can distinguish genuine community benefit from promotional activity.

Reports concerning work at the proposed Wesley Vale site also demonstrate the importance of effective oversight. In September 2026, Latrobe Council requested that work stop while it investigated whether Firmus' activities went beyond the scope of an approved forest practices plan; the matter should not be represented as a proven breach before a finding is made. [9] Independent inspection and immediate compliance powers are nonetheless vital because environmental damage may be irreversible before a dispute is resolved.

Requested change: Make early disclosure and participation compulsory, establish minimum consultation standards, disclose relevant community-benefit arrangements, and ensure public consultation does not substitute for independent regulatory assessment.

4. Expectation 3 — Engagement with the Tasmanian Government

The Office of the Coordinator-General may facilitate investment, but facilitation must be clearly separated from regulatory assessment and enforcement. A government agency promoting a development should not be able to predetermine, constrain or privately negotiate its environmental or planning outcome.

All material government agreements, memoranda of understanding, concessional arrangements, public funding commitments and infrastructure undertakings for data centres should be disclosed, with genuinely security-sensitive and narrowly defined commercial details protected where necessary. The existence, duration, parties, public obligations, financial exposure and material risks of agreements should not be hidden behind blanket claims of commercial confidentiality.

The draft says commercially viable projects should not rely on government financial support. This should be a binding policy prohibiting direct and indirect subsidies, discounted or publicly subsidised electricity or water, taxpayer-funded enabling infrastructure and transfer of stranded-asset risks, except where Parliament expressly authorises and publicly justifies a measure after independent assessment. Public support may otherwise be concealed in apparently commercial contracts and contingent liabilities.

Requested change: Legislate transparent dealings and strict separation between investment promotion and regulation, require disclosure of public financial exposures, and prohibit unauthorised public subsidies and risk transfers.

5. Expectation 4 — Supporting Tasmania's energy system

5.1 Reject the proposed requirement to stimulate new wind and solar projects

Page 10 of the *Draft Expectations for Data Centres and AI Infrastructure Developers* requires data centre proponents to support additional renewable generation and to enter commercial arrangements sufficient to enable new wind and solar projects. This is precisely the policy direction I oppose.

New wind farms, solar developments, substations and high-voltage transmission lines can have major consequences for farmland, threatened species, wetlands, forests, landscapes, property rights, waterways, tourism and local communities. Describing electricity as renewable does not make those physical impacts disappear. Nor do annual renewable-energy certificates demonstrate that sufficient electricity is available at the particular time and location it is needed.

Project Marinus and the associated North West Transmission Developments raise further questions about cumulative infrastructure expansion and whether new electricity-intensive industries will increase pressure for further generation and transmission. A data centre's claimed benefits should not be assessed in isolation from infrastructure that it induces or materially depends upon. However, the submission does not assume that any particular Marinus component is being built solely for data centres.

My preferred policy is that **no additional wind farm or major transmission infrastructure should be justified or constructed for the purpose of servicing new large-scale data centre demand**. A limited facility should be considered only where independently demonstrated existing surplus supply, available network capacity and other public-interest tests are satisfied. If an existing major industrial user closes and releases electricity, that electricity should first be considered for household affordability, security, existing industry and alternative productive uses.

5.2 Grid stability is a separate and serious risk

There is a second danger beyond the sheer quantity of energy consumed: the behaviour of large loads during grid disturbances. Reuters reported that in July 2024 around 60 data centres near Washington, DC, transferred to backup generation during a voltage disturbance, causing a sudden loss of grid demand that operators had to manage urgently. [3]

AEMO's *2025 Transition Plan for System Security* identifies fault ride-through, rapid demand ramping and oscillating power consumption as system-security concerns associated with large inverter-based loads, including data centres. [2] Sudden disconnection of multiple facilities can threaten system stability just as high continuous consumption can threaten energy adequacy.

Every large facility should therefore be subject to binding technical requirements, established with AEMO and TasNetworks, including pre-connection independent modelling of maximum and staged loads; coordinated fault ride-through and protection settings; limits on rapid demand changes; real-time operational visibility; mandatory emergency demand reduction; and periodic compliance testing. Data centres must have no entitlement to protect the continuous operation of their computers at the expense of grid security for hospitals, households, farms and existing industry.

5.3 Public businesses must not underwrite private commercial risks

Hydro Tasmania has publicly reported that it is assessing Firmus's request for a long-term agreement for approximately **444 MW**. Its information, last updated on 27 August 2026, described alternatives under which Firmus contracts directly with new generators, or Hydro becomes an intermediary contracting with those generators while supplying Firmus. Hydro stated at that time that no decision had been made. [4]

An intermediary arrangement can create contractual exposure if a data centre operator fails to pay, reduces demand or closes while Hydro remains committed to purchases from generators. Other possible exposures include firming costs, generation delays, adverse market movements and stranded investment. These are risks requiring independent assessment.

Hydro Tasmania, Aurora Energy and TasNetworks must not be permitted or pressured to assume any financial or commercial risk arising from data centre developments. In particular, Hydro Tasmania must not enter into arrangements under which it assumes contractual obligations to construct, finance, underwrite or purchase electricity from new wind farms or other generation projects for the benefit of data centre developers. Data centre developers must bear the full costs and risks of their own electricity supply, generation, firming and associated infrastructure, without transferring any risk to Tasmania's publicly owned electricity businesses, taxpayers or existing electricity customers. This must be an absolute requirement, not merely a risk to be assessed or mitigated. If an arrangement cannot be structured without exposing Tasmania's publicly owned businesses or the Tasmanian public to financial risk, it must not proceed.

There is also uncertainty around where new electricity generation intended to supply data centres would be located. ABC reporting on 10 October indicated that a Firmus-commissioned submission contemplated renewable-energy investment elsewhere in the National Electricity Market, while Hydro Tasmania stated that the projects within its assessment were located in Tasmania. [7] Neither approach is acceptable. I oppose data centres creating demand for new wind farms, solar farms, transmission lines or other electricity infrastructure, whether in Tasmania or elsewhere in Australia. Constructing this infrastructure interstate does not eliminate its environmental and social consequences; it merely transfers those impacts to other communities. Tasmania should not encourage an industry whose electricity demands necessitate such developments. Only data centres capable of operating using genuinely existing surplus electricity in Tasmania, without requiring additional generation or transmission infrastructure or disadvantaging existing electricity users, should even be considered.

5.4 Full cost recovery and demand limits

The expression “fair share” in the *Draft Expectations for Data Centres and AI Infrastructure Developers* is inadequate. Developers should pay the **full incremental cost** of connections, reinforcement, system-strength services, firming attributable to their demand and any necessary upgrades, together with appropriate financial security for stranded assets. Existing customers must not be exposed to higher costs because a large customer fails or reduces its demand.

Requested change: Delete and replace Expectation 4(a); prohibit demand-driven expansion of environmentally damaging generation and transmission; limit data centre eligibility to independently verified existing surplus energy; and require enforceable grid-security performance, load caps, emergency curtailment and full-cost recovery.

6. Expectation 5 — Sustainable water usage

Water security must be assessed under credible drought scenarios, not solely average annual rainfall. Water needed for households, agriculture, rivers, ecosystems and existing industries should take precedence over discretionary industrial computing.

The Government should require independently verified, publicly disclosed estimates of daily peak, annual and drought-period water demand, cooling methodology, evaporative losses, wastewater composition and disposal, planned and contingency water sources, and the legal basis for each proposed source. No project should be approved on an assumption that supplementary water can be obtained later without established rights and an independent assessment of effects on existing users.

This concern is illustrated by ABC reporting in July 2026 about an internal Firmus note that referred to possible use of Tasmanian Irrigation water at Wesley Vale. Tasmanian Irrigation said no supply undertaking had been given, while the company stated that rainwater harvesting was proposed as the primary source and supplementary arrangements were contingent. [8] Such uncertainty should be resolved before an approval decision, not after construction begins.

Chemical contamination and wastewater pollution

Water consumption is not the only environmental concern associated with data centre cooling systems. Depending on the cooling technology used, chemicals such as biocides, corrosion inhibitors and anti-scaling agents may be added to circulating water. Evaporative cooling systems can produce wastewater containing concentrated dissolved substances and residual treatment chemicals. Leaks, spills or inadequate treatment and disposal of cooling fluids and wastewater could potentially contaminate soils, groundwater, rivers and other waterways. [14]

Data centre proponents should therefore be required to disclose all chemicals used in their cooling and water-treatment systems, the composition and quantities of all wastewater streams, and exactly how wastewater will be treated, stored and disposed of. An independent environmental assessment should establish that these arrangements will not cause unacceptable contamination risks. Binding conditions must require appropriate containment, wastewater treatment, monitoring, spill prevention and emergency-response procedures. **Untreated or inadequately treated wastewater must not be permitted to enter Tasmania's waterways, groundwater or surrounding environment.** These obligations must be mandatory and enforceable, with substantial penalties and powers to suspend operations where serious breaches occur.

Applicants should be required to demonstrate robust water efficiency and drought resilience, with binding metered limits and independently audited public reporting. Agricultural irrigation water must not be diverted from farmers without a transparent legal process and demonstrated absence of harm.

Requested change: Require proven water rights and drought-resilient supply before approval; impose enforceable consumption limits; protect agriculture, drinking water and environmental flows; and introduce mandatory chemical disclosure, independent wastewater assessments, strict pollution controls, ongoing water-quality monitoring and substantial penalties for breaches.

7. Expectation 6 — Approval pathways, pollution, noise and safety

The assertion that the existing planning and environmental systems are adequate is not supported merely because they already exist. In August and September 2026, public reporting recorded serious concerns from George Town and Latrobe Council representatives about the suitability of existing pathways for projects of this size, including the absence of a clearly defined data centre use class and limits on assessment of cumulative effects. [5][6]

The Tasmanian Planning Scheme should include a dedicated use classification and clear development standards for substantial AI and data centre facilities. Decisions should not turn on an insufficiently tested assumption that a large commercial computing operation belongs in the “Utilities” category. Projects and their associated infrastructure should be assessed as an integrated whole, with independent scrutiny of cumulative environmental, agricultural, socioeconomic and electricity-system effects.

No approval should be based on preliminary noise or emission modelling followed by an assumption that essential information can be supplied during detailed design. The public should be shown credible worst-case operating scenarios, including all cooling equipment, transformers, ventilation, generators, tonal and low-frequency characteristics, simultaneous operation and cumulative noise from neighbouring facilities. Enforceable limits, independent baseline measurements, post-commissioning verification and meaningful enforcement are essential.

Diesel generators: the conditions must reflect the actual proposed operation

The recent Bell Bay controversy makes this issue urgent. ABC News reported on 10 October that Tasmania’s EPA Board had sought to participate in a TASCAT appeal concerning conditions limiting the use of **276 diesel generators** at Firmus's approved Long Reach facility. The EPA Board expressed concern that wider use now sought by the operator could have changed its original decision about environmental assessment. [7]

A proposal should be assessed on every reasonably foreseeable use of its generators, not only a narrow description of emergency standby use. Backup diesel generation should not be permitted to become routine electricity-market supply or a means of avoiding demand-curtailment obligations without full environmental reassessment, lawful authorisation and fresh public participation.

Air quality, cumulative emissions, particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, noise, fuel storage, fire and hazardous-goods risks must be assessed before approval. Applicable permit conditions should tightly restrict use and require continuous operating-hour logs, compliance monitoring and publication of non-sensitive results.

Security, sabotage and effects on neighbours

Large AI facilities can also raise cybersecurity, physical-security and critical-infrastructure risks. Public discussion, including the *Superintelligence Strategy* paper associated with former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and other authors, has contemplated sabotage of strategically significant AI infrastructure. I am not asserting that any particular Tasmanian development is likely to be attacked. Nevertheless, concerns that have been publicly raised do warrant

independent, proportionate risk assessment where a facility's scale, function or customers make such threats credible. [12]

Site choice, emergency plans, fire and hazardous-material risks, electricity and telecommunications dependencies, and consequences for neighbouring communities should be examined. Genuinely sensitive security details can remain confidential without withholding meaningful non-sensitive conclusions from residents.

Requested change: Reform the planning and environmental assessment framework; require full-build-out and cumulative impact assessment; strengthen noise, emissions and generator controls; and provide genuine consultation and appeal rights.

8. Expectation 7 — Transparency and reporting; protecting democracy

The draft merely encourages reporting beyond existing requirements. That is inadequate for facilities drawing heavily on publicly owned infrastructure and scarce resources. Disclosure should be mandatory, independently audited and publicly accessible, subject to precise safeguards for personal privacy and genuine security-sensitive information.

At a minimum, the public should be able to see each facility's approved and actual electricity demand; water consumption and sources; emissions; generator operating hours; noise compliance; breaches and enforcement action; permanent employment; local procurement; major government agreements; public support and contingent liabilities; ownership and control; and progress against binding commitments.

I am particularly concerned that companies controlling major investments and large amounts of essential resources may accumulate undue influence over elected representatives and government policy. Governments should not become dependent on an industry's investment announcements, tax promises or electricity purchases to the point that they are unwilling to regulate it.

Tasmania's lobbying rules do not generally require registration by companies lobbying government on their own behalf through their staff. [13] That gap is especially troubling where negotiations concern electricity contracts, public assets and planning decisions of statewide significance.

I ask the Government to develop the strongest constitutionally valid protections against undue data centre industry influence. These should include prohibitions on political donations and gifts from relevant developers and controlled entities where constitutionally permissible; comprehensive registration and timely public disclosure of in-house and third-party lobbying; public registers of ministerial and senior-official meetings; publication of material lobbying requests and government responses; strict conflict-of-interest, post-employment and procurement rules; and effective penalties for concealment or breaches.

People connected with the industry retain ordinary democratic rights, including the right to stand for elected office subject to applicable law. The protection required is rigorous disclosure of financial and employment interests, conflicts and recusals—not arbitrary denial of democratic rights. Legitimate regulatory communication must also remain possible, but should occur through transparent, auditable channels rather than privileged private access.

Foreign control and multinational tax arrangements warrant further scrutiny. The State should seek enhanced beneficial-ownership reporting, notification of changes in control and cooperation with Commonwealth foreign-investment, taxation and national-security regulators. No claim of commercial confidentiality should defeat disclosure of public obligations or material risks to Tasmania.

Requested change: Replace voluntary best-practice reporting with enforceable public reporting, independent audit, strong anti-corruption safeguards and meaningful controls on corporate political influence.

9. Mandatory standards need meaningful consequences

Legislation should expressly establish the standards applicable to new, expanded and, to the extent lawfully possible, existing large data centres. These should be implemented through statutory duties, binding approval and connection conditions and permits, with clear responsibility allocated to appropriate State and national regulators.

An independent regulator must be adequately resourced to inspect sites, examine records, audit monitoring systems, investigate complaints and enforce conditions without expecting affected residents to undertake expensive civil litigation.

The legislation should provide proportionate but effective escalating consequences:

- **Corrective directions:** binding rectification notices and deadlines for minor breaches.
- **Financial penalties:** substantial civil penalties for non-compliance, misleading information, failure to report and concealment, with penalties calibrated to seriousness, advantage obtained and company size so that non-compliance is not profitable.
- **Operational limits:** enforceable reduction of electricity use, water withdrawal or generator operation where conditions are exceeded.
- **Immediate protection:** stop-work and emergency operational directions where serious or imminent harm to health, the environment or system security is credibly identified.
- **Persistent or serious breaches:** independent supervision, suspension and—where legally authorised—cancellation or revocation of relevant approvals or licences, with appropriate procedural safeguards.
- **Criminal enforcement:** investigation and prosecution where conduct meets the elements of a statutory offence.
- **Restoration and recovery:** enforceable remediation, decommissioning and recovery of the public costs of dealing with breaches or abandoned works.

The State should also investigate carefully designed public-interest step-in powers for circumstances where a data centre operator seriously or repeatedly breaches its legal obligations, or where its activities pose a serious threat to essential services, public safety, energy or water security, the environment or other vital public interests, and ordinary enforcement measures are insufficient. An administrator or temporary operator could be appointed under clear statutory criteria, independent oversight, judicial review and compensation safeguards where applicable. The purpose is to ensure that essential Tasmanian resources and communities are not left unprotected when a major operator refuses or fails to comply with lawful obligations.

10. Conclusion and final requests

Tasmania should not allow its electricity policy, water resources, planning laws or democratic institutions to be reshaped around the needs of industrial-scale AI data centres. The attractions of announced capital investment cannot justify an open-ended claim on resources that belong to Tasmania's wider community and support its existing economy and natural environment.

The Government's *Draft Expectations for Data Centres and AI Infrastructure Developers* should **not** be finalised in its present form. Its emphasis on enabling new renewable development should be removed, its reliance on existing assessment pathways reconsidered, and its non-statutory assurances replaced with a genuinely enforceable public-interest framework.

I ask the Tasmanian Government to publish a reasoned response to the consultation, identify which recommendations have been accepted or rejected and why, and undertake genuine further public consultation before adopting any policy that commits the State to large-scale data centre growth.

The governing principle should be simple: Tasmania's energy, water, public infrastructure, environment and democratic institutions must serve Tasmanians—not be subordinated to the commercial demands of a powerful new industry.

Yours faithfully,

[redacted]

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